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ABSTRACT
Health institutions have realized the importance of privacy engineering that focuses on
development of guidelines, practices and models for the protection of patients’ privacy.
However, due to the intricate healthcare systems with transitive health workflows, the processing
of patient information in one setting may be more problematic than that in another. As a solution
to this problem, we deconstruct the complex transitive healthcare system into individual activity
sub-systems, and develop an inter-organizational privacy risk model that facilitates assessing
privacy risk in individual activity sub-systems within the transitive health information
workflows. This research contributes to privacy engineering by demonstrating how the privacy
risk model can be utilized to mitigate the risks to patient information.
Keywords: Privacy engineering, Health system privacy risk model, Inter-organizational setting,
Activity theory, Policy-carrying-data
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INTRODUCTION
Health institutions have started to recognize the importance of privacy engineering.
Privacy engineering is an upcoming recent field focusing on privacy aspects in design of systems
that need to be able to deal with risks to individuals’ privacy. NIST (2014) defines privacy
engineering as a “… collection of methods to support the mitigation of risks to individuals’
personal information within information systems” (p. 1). In order to provide guidance to
decrease the risk related to privacy harm, NIST (2014) developed a privacy risk model to
mitigate privacy risks arising from unanticipated consequence of normal system behavior. The
privacy risk model is “… intended to help organizations identify where controls can be
implemented effectively …” (NIST, 2014; p. 3). In this paper, we provide an extension that
focuses on health privacy risk (hereon referred to as HPR), and enables the health organizations
to assess privacy risk as a function of patient information, data actions and healthcare context,
where context is the circumstance surrounding the patient information. The context is key
privacy concern, which serves as primary modifier that can identify the threshold where a normal
action becomes “problematic”.
The healthcare system consists of transitive workflows with information flowing from
various cross-boundary organizations (Lechler et al., 2011). Consequently, the processing of
patient information in one setting may be different from that of another setting. Due to the
transitivity within the healthcare system, it becomes essential to deconstruct the interorganizational relationships into individual activity sub-systems (Bharosa et al., 2012) so as to
better recognize and control the privacy risk. We develop an inter-organizational HPR model that
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facilitates assessing privacy risk in individual activity sub-systems within the transitive health
information workflows.
Activity Theory is a powerful and clarifying descriptive tool with the objective to
understand the activity (Nardi, 1995). It gives the flexibility of breaking up complex tasks into
activities that are easy to interpret and manage (Shanker et al., 2009). In this paper, we use
Activity Theory as a lens to guide the development of the inter-organization HPR model. Our
contributions in this research-in-progress paper are two-fold: First, we develop an HPR model
that facilitates assessing privacy risk in individual activity sub-systems based on Activity
Theory. Second, we incorporate organizational interconnectedness within the HPR model in
order to assess the overall privacy risk within a transitive health workflow. By demonstrating
how the HPR model mitigates risk to patient information by enforcing inter-organizational risk
controls, this research contributes to the privacy engineering literature.

ACTIVITY THEORY
Activity Theory is a framework that provides a lens to analyze the activity of a group or
an organization (Chaudhury et al., 2001). It considers an activity consisting of six major
elements: subject, object and community supported by tools, rules and division of labor. It
suggests that an activity is directed towards an object, mediated by the instrument and socially
constituted within the environment (Bertelsen & Bodker, 2003). The subject is the individual or
the group performing the activity supported by instruments on the object that can be either an
ideal or a material object. This interaction between the subject and object is confined within the
environment consisting of rules, responsibilities and communities (Chen et al., 2013).
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The principal components of the healthcare workflow change depending on the
circumstances (Chen et al., 2008) and their relationships within the environment undergo
frequent restructuration. We apply Activity Theory to investigate healthcare information
workflows along the elements of an activity system: subject, object, instrument, community,
rule, and division of labor. This allows us to untangle the context within the HPR model and to
recognize the key data elements that risk administrators will value during the data flow.

HEALTH PRIVACY RISK (HPR) MODEL
In this section, we elicit the Activity Theory approach to development of HPR model. We
adapt a privacy risk model based on NIST (2014) to include patient information, data action and
context. The context is the circumstance surrounding system’s use of patient information. The
context should include the roles within the organization as well as the mediating elements, like
rules and tools.
In the HPR model (see Figure 1), role refers to the subject actor. The patient information
is the patient’s private data. The data action defines the type of access requested on the patient
data. The organization component is intended to specify aspects of the external healthcare
community. The obligation is the tool for enforcing the risk control, and the rules are the logic
for risk control decision, within the healthcare context.
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Figure 1. Activity Theory based Privacy Risk Model in Healthcare Setting
The HPR model focuses on the risk of problematic data action within the health activity
system. The problematic data actions are those data-related actions that contravene the privacy
objectives of a system and cause harm to a patient. The HPR model allows the designers to
concentrate on the privacy risk within each element of the activity system, thereby allowing them
to better recognize and control actions resulting in such risks. Health system privacy risk is the
risk of problematic data actions within the health workflow consisting of activity systems
denoted as the following function:
Health System Privacy Risk 1 = f(Patient Information; Patient Data Actions; (Health Organizations;
Healthcare Roles; Healthcare Rules; Healthcare Obligations))
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INTER-ORGANIZATIONAL HEALTH PRIVACY RISK (HPR) MODEL
The organizational literature argues that organizational processes are constructed through
the relationship between organizations (Carlile, 2002). The literature clarifies the relationship
among organizations and activity systems (Gal et al., 2008; Yakura, 2002), and calls for more
careful consideration of how the organizations become “entangled” in the process of information
exchange (Bharosa et al., 2012).

Figure 2. Inter-Organizational Privacy Risk Model in Healthcare Setting
The healthcare system is a complex system that involves transitive workflows. Valecha et
al., (2014) extend Activity Theory to consider “organizational interconnectedness” as an
important perspective that enables the examination of the data flow from one organization to the
other in the transition over an organization sequence. In a similar vein, we propose a framework
(see Figure 2) to assess the overall risk in such an organization sequence. While the activity
systems consist of components that differ from one organization to the other, they also share
portions of activity data within interconnections. In the HPR model, the privacy risks for each
activity system are evaluated by assessing their major activity system elements. The shared
portion of the activity systems are evaluated by assessing the activity system interaction
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elements. The overall risk in the health workflow system is thus the function of risk from
individual activity systems, and risk arising out of their inter-connectedness.
Health System Privacy Risk 2 = f(Activity System Risk; Activity Interaction Risk)

For example, consider a context i, wherein a research facility utilizing a cloud vendor for
securely storing patient’s personal data. The lapses in the cloud vendor's data access mechanism
that denies the patient access to his/her own medical record makes the normal operation of
storing data problematic by restricting the patient. Such an unwarranted restriction can cause
harm to the patient including loss of trust (NIST, 2014). The unwarranted restriction can be
denoted as a function of Activity System Risk as follows:
Unwarranted Restrictioni = f(Activity System Risk) = f(Patient Information; Read Denial; Patient)

Now, consider that some service organization also utilizes the same cloud vendor for the
storing patients’ medical data. The normal operation of storing data becomes problematic in
organizations’ inter-connectedness when the two data sets can be aggregated leading to
unanticipated revelation (Valecha et al., 2012). Such a revelation can cause harm to the patient
including stigmatization, power imbalance, etc. (NIST, 2014). The unanticipated revelation is a
function of Activity System Risk and Activity Interaction Risk, and denoted as follows
Unanticipated Revelationi = f(Activity System Risk; Activity Interaction Risk) = f(Patient Information;
Information Aggregation; Organizational-Interconnectedness(Service Orgn; Research Orgn))

The overall risk in the workflow in this context can be described as the function below.
Due to restrictions on the page limit, we denote the overall health system privacy risk as a
function of only unwarranted restriction and unanticipated revelation in the context i.
Overall Health System Privacy Risk = f(Unwarranted Restriction; Unanticipated Revelation)
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INTER-ORGANIZATIONAL PRIVACY RISK CONTROL
The activity Theory elements of instrument, rule and responsibility can be used for
specifying risk controls (Valecha et al., 2012). In the HPR model, rules, obligations and actions
enforce risk controls within the activity system. However, in a transitive workflow with varying
privacy risk within each organization and between them, it becomes difficult to apply
organizational risk control, especially for data between organizations. In such cases,
organizations usually prefer HIPAA compliance agreements with other organizations to ensure
risk controls. For example, in order for insurance agencies to request data from hospitals, they
need to demonstrate privacy safeguard of patient data as per HIPAA regulations.
In a distributed environment, when data is sent from one party to another, the receiver
faces the question of whether the data is well-traced. If not, then accepting such data may lead to
vulnerabilities (Chong et al., 2014). Proof-Carrying-Data is a recently-introduced mechanism
that allows data in a distributed environment to be accompanied by some proof that the data
complies with specified standards (Necula, 2011).
We extend this concept of proof-carrying-data in a transitive healthcare setting. The data
in healthcare setting is distributed among organizations such as hospitals, insurance companies,
employer agencies, research labs, governmental offices, etc. If the data is not risk-proof, then the
receiving organization faces the problem of privacy risk. In order to mitigate privacy risk, we
design the HPR model to allow the patient data to be accompanied by formalized privacy
policies. This concept of policy-carrying-data as a risk control mechanism in an interorganizational healthcare setting between the activity systems is described next.
When one organization (consumer) requests access to patient data from another
organization (provider), this activity is deconstructed by the privacy risk model in order to
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identify key risk constructs within individual activity sub-systems. The provider systems’ HPR
model then generates policies, made up of actions, rules and obligations (Valecha et al., 2014),
and transfers them along with masked patient data. These policies are compared with the
consumer systems’ HPR model’s rules and obligations to determine whether the patient data is
safe to access. If the policies match, then the patient data is unmasked.

Figure 3. Inter-Organizational Privacy Risk Controls
For example, as illustrated in Figure 3, consider the scenario where a physician requests
(A) read access to patient’s diagnosis from the researcher in the laboratories. The researcher sets
up policies made up of actions, rules and obligations (B). The policy enforces the access to data
in the healthcare setting only (as a rule), and in a non-healthcare setting through network LAN
(as an obligation) for the read data (as an action) on the diagnosis data. This policy accompanies
the masked patient diagnosis data (C) to the hospital side. The policy is matched to the actual
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conditions of physician mode of access, only after which the diagnosis data gets available for
reading by the physician.

CONCLUSION
The HPR model safeguards patient’s privacy data by mitigating the risks arising from
unanticipated consequences of normal system behavior. However, the healthcare system is
complex due to the transitive nature of health workflows, wherein the processing of patient
information in one setting may be acceptable, but may be problematic in another setting. As a
solution to this problem, in this research-in-progress paper, we develop an inter-organizational
HPR model that facilitates assessing privacy risk in individual activity sub-systems within the
transitive health information workflows.
Our methodology can help develop solutions that can enforce risk controls in an interorganizational setting, thereby facilitating secure sharing of private health records. In future
research, we plan to validate the HPR model using real data from multiple health organizations.
Further, we shall generate a prototypical implementation of the model and show the application
of the HPR model in the healthcare setting.
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